The most cardinal research of FDI factors was conducted by Tormenting in 1988. His eclectic paradigm provides a conceptual and theoretical model for analysing FDI determiners by stipulating three necessary conditions- ownership advantage, location advantage, and internalisation advantage ( OLI ) . The theory points out that a house must possess an ownership advantage in order to vie with foreign and domestic houses in the foreign market it wishes to put ; internalisation factors that make it preferred to work the ownership advantages within the house, instead than to licence production ; and a location advantage to bring forth in a foreign market, otherwise the house would export its merchandises to the foreign market.
In 1998 Tormenting farther pointed out that the attraction of FDI locations is determined by investing motive, which he classified into four classs: market-seeking ( horizontal scheme to entree the host-country domestic market ) , resource-seeking ( to entree natural stuffs, labour force, and physical substructure resources ) , efficiency-seeking ( perpendicular scheme to take advantage of lower labour costs, particularly in developing states ) , and strategic assets-seeking ( to entree research and development [ R & A ; D ] , invention, and advanced engineering ) . He argued that much of the recent FDI in developing states is stimulated either by market-seeking motivations or by efficiency-seeking and resource-seeking motivations.
The similar categorization was given in 1998 by UNCTAD in the World Investment Report. They have analyzed the determiners of FDI and host state determiners have been classified into the three groups. These are politic factors, concern facilitation and economic factors.
The UNCTAD ‘s Classification of FDI Determinants can be seen from Table 1
Tax policy, trade policy, denationalization policy, macroeconomic policy
Market size, market growing, market construction
Natural stuffs, labour cost, engineering
Conveyance and communicating costs, labour productiveness
Beginning: UNCTAD ( 1998 ) .
All subsequent surveies divided FDI determiners into three categories-demand-side factors ( e.g. host market size and income distribution ) , supply side factors ( e.g. skilled labour, R & A ; D, and substructure ) , and institutional factors ( e.g. civilization, rational belongings rights, dealing costs, political hazard, corruptness, and bureaucratism ) .
Market size and market growing are considered as the most of import determiners of FDI location for horizontal market-seeking FDI. Market size straight affects investing return and net incomes, and a higher market growing indicates a possible larger market and more promising chances. FDI, hence, tends to flux to the states with larger market size and higher economic growing rates in which larger economic systems of graduated table could be provided for FDI to work their ownership advantages ( Culem, 1988 ) .
Pye ( 1998 ) conducted a study with a sample of 334 i¬?rms from the chief European and North American states in footings of investing into the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary between 1989 and 1996. He found that the taking driver in 34 % of the sample was market size and its growing potency.
Artige and Nicolini ( 2005 ) province that market size as measured by GDP or GDP per capita seems to be the most robust FDI determiner in econometric surveies. Jordaan ( 2004 ) references that FDI will travel to states with larger and spread outing markets and greater buying power, where houses can potentially have a higher return on their capital and higher net income from their investings.
Jaspersen et Al. ( 2000 ) use the opposite of income per capita as a placeholder for the return on capital and conclude that existent GDP per capita is reciprocally related to FDI/GDP, but Asiedu ( 2002 ) happen a positive relationship between the two variables. He argues that a higher GDP per capita implies better chances for FDI in the host state. Parletun ( 2008 ) finds that the variable GDP is positive and statistically important at less than 1 % degree. She argues that the expansion of market size tends to excite the attractive force of FDI to the economic system. Ang ( 2008 ) finds that existent GDP has a important positive impact on FDI influxs. He besides finds that growing rate of GDP exerts a little positive impact on inward FDI.
The function of growing in pulling FDI has besides been the topic of contention. Charkrabarti ( 2001 ) states that the growing hypothesis developed by Lim ( 1983 ) maintains that a quickly turning economic system provides comparatively better chances for doing net incomes than the 1s turning easy or non turning at all. Lunn ( 1980 ) , Schneider and Frey ( 1985 ) and Culem ( 1988 ) happen a significantly positive consequence of growing on FDI, while Tsai ( 1994 ) obtains a strong support for the hypothesis over the period 1983 to 1986, but merely a weak nexus from 1975 to 1978. On the other manus, Nigh ( 1985 ) reports a weak positive correlativity for the less developed economic systems and a weak negative correlativity for the developed states.
Ancharaz ( 2003 ) finds a positive consequence with lagged growing for the full sample and for the non-Sub-Saharan African states, but an undistinguished consequence for the Sub-Saharan Africa sample. Gastanaga et Al. ( 1998 ) and Schneider and Frey ( 1985 ) found positive important effects of growing on FDI.
Mold ( 2003 ) conducted an econometric analysis with a sample of developed European states, which grouped into ‘core ‘ 1s ( Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether lands, and UK ) and ‘peripheral ‘ 1s ( Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain ) , and examined the FDI outi¬‚ows of the USA fabrication afi¬?liates into the aforesaid states. He observed that lone market growing potency and exchange rate variableness were signii¬?cant, followed by the comparative unit labour costs.
Differences in production efficiency between place and host states have great impacts on FDI locational determination devising. Labor cost, along with market size and growing, is another major determiner of FDI flows. For case, a developed state with high labour costs is likely to relocate labour-intensive production to another state such as China and India with low labour costs. Therefore, it is expected that low labour costs in the host state are positively associated with more FDI influxs.
Charkrabarti ( 2001 ) claims that pay as an index of labour cost has been the most combative of all the possible determiners of FDI.
There is no unanimity in the surveies sing the function of rewards in pulling FDI. Goldsbrough ( 1979 ) , Saunders ( 1982 ) , Flamm ( 1984 ) , Schneider and Frey ( 1985 ) , Culem ( 1988 ) , and Shamsuddin ( 1994 ) demonstrate that higher rewards discourage FDI. Tsai ( 1994 ) obtains strong support for the cheap-labor hypothesis over the period 1983 to 1986, but weak support from 1975 to 1978. In ODI ( 1997 ) , it is stated that empirical research has besides found comparative labour costs to be statistically important, peculiarly for foreign investing in labour-intensive industries and for export-oriented subordinates.
Labor quality besides is an of import factor for FDI consideration. In his paper Ting Gao ( 2002 ) examines the ei¬ˆect of labour quality on the location of FDI in instance of China. He uses recent informations on Chinese provincial-level FDI by puting state and i¬?nd that labour quality plays a signii¬?cant and positive function in pulling FDI.
Numerous empirical surveies suggest that trade ( imports and exports ) complements instead than replacements for FDI. Multinational endeavors ( MNEs ) tend to put in the trade spouse markets with which they are familiar. High volumes of trade might bespeak a high economic integrating between the states. As argued by Grosse and Trevino ( 1996 ) , exports to the host state may be used to provide subordinates at that place while imports from the subordinates may be used to provide the parent company in the place state. Therefore, greater bilateral trade will promote more FDI flows to the host state.
Charkrabarti ( 2001 ) states that there is assorted grounds refering the significance of openness, which is measured largely by the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, in finding FDI, every bit good. The kept up hypothesis is: given that most investing undertakings are directed towards the tradable sector, a state ‘s grade of openness to international trade should be a relevant factor in the determination. Jordaan ( 2004 ) claims that the impact of openness on FDI depends on the type of investing. When investings are market-seeking, trade limitations ( and hence less openness ) can hold a positive impact on FDI. The ground stems from the “ duty jumping ” hypothesis, which argues that foreign houses that seek to function local markets may make up one’s mind to put up subordinates in the host state if it is hard to import their merchandises to the state. In contrast, transnational houses engaged in export-oriented investings may prefer to put in a more unfastened economic system since increased imperfectnesss that accompany trade protection by and large imply higher dealing costs associated with exportation.
In add-on, Kravis and Lipsey ( 1982 ) , Culem ( 1988 ) , Edwards ( 1990 ) happen a strong positive consequence of trade openness on FDI, whereas Schmitz and Bieri ( 1972 ) obtain a weak positive nexus. Parletun ( 2008 ) finds that openness is positive but statistically important from nothing.
In general, a scope of studies suggests a widespread perceptual experience that “ unfastened ” economic systems encourage more foreign investing.
Exchange Rate and Inflation
Economies that have weak currencies will pull FDI influxs from strong currency economic systems, as this investing would bask higher buying power within the host state. The antonym is besides true: states that have strong currencies will discourage FDI influxs, as the strong currencies would do puting much more expensive ( Clegg & A ; Scott-Green, 1999 ) . Similarly, economic systems that have higher rising prices will discourage FDI escapes, as rising prices will deprecate the place currency and the same sum invested agencies less value in footings of the host-country currency, lower buying power, and capacity in the host state.
The consequence of exchange rates on FDI has been examined both with regard to alterations in the bilateral degree of the exchange rate between states and in the volatility of exchange rates. Until Froot and Stein [ 1991 ] , the common wisdom was that ( expected ) alterations in the degree of the exchange rate would non change the determination by a i¬?rm to put in a foreign state. In unsmooth footings, while an grasp of a i¬?rm ‘s place state ‘s currency would take down the cost of assets abroad, the ( expected ) nominal return goes down every bit good in the place currency, go forthing the rate of return indistinguishable.
Gast & A ; Herrmann ( 2008 ) focused on the designation of the factors that led to the world-wide addition of FDI during the 1990s and besides, they addressed the inquiry whether these determiners ini¬‚uenced exports in a different manner. They found that a alteration in entire market size is an of import feature that leads both FDI and exports in the same way. Relative market size affects merely exports significantly. Their political indexs and exchange rate alterations suggested that exports are demand-driven, whereas FDI is supply-driven. They concluded that ‘FDI and exports tended to flux comparatively less copiously to distant states than to nearby states over the period under consideration. This supports the thought of a complementary relationship between investing and trade ‘ ( Gast & A ; Herrmann, 2008, p.1 )
Interest in the effects of revenue enhancements on FDI has been considerable from both international and public economic experts. The literature remains reasonably indecisive sing whether FDI may be sensitive to revenue enhancement inducements. Some surveies have shown that host state corporate revenue enhancements have a important negative consequence on FDI flows. Others have reported that revenue enhancements do non hold a important consequence on FDI. Hartman ( 1994 ) , Grubert and Mutti ( 1991 ) , Hines and Rice ( 1994 ) , Loree and Guisinger ( 1995 ) , Cassou ( 1997 ) and Kemsley ( 1998 ) find that host state corporate income revenue enhancements have a important negative consequence on pulling FDI flows. However, Root and Ahmed ( 1979 ) , Lim ( 1983 ) , Wheeler and Mody ( 1992 ) , Jackson and Markowski ( 1995 ) , Yulin and Reed ( 1995 ) and Porcano and Price ( 1996 ) conclude that revenue enhancements do non hold a important consequence on FDI. Swenson ( 1994 ) reports a positive correlativity. Culem ( 1988 ) found that higher involvement rates in the host state may pull FDI ini¬‚ows. BeA?nassy-QueA? reA? et Al. ( 2001 ) who examined individually nominal and effectual revenue enhancement rates found a systematically signii¬?cant and negative relationship between revenue enhancement and FD I ini¬‚ows, irrespectively of the revenue enhancement signifier.
Infrastructure covers many dimensions runing from roads, ports, railroads and telecommunication systems to institutional development ( e.g. accounting, legal services, etc. ) . Harmonizing to ODI ( 1997 ) , hapless substructure can be seen, nevertheless, as both an obstruction and an chance for foreign investing. For the bulk of low-income states, it is frequently cited as one of the major restraints. But foreign investors besides point to the potency for pulling important FDI if host authoritiess permit more significant foreign engagement in the substructure sector. Jordaan ( 2004 ) claims that good quality and well-developed substructure increases the productiveness potency of investings in a state and hence stimulates FDI flows towards the state. Harmonizing to Asiedu ( 2002 ) and Ancharaz ( 2003 ) , the figure of telephones per 1,000 dwellers is a standard measuring in the literature for substructure development. However, harmonizing to Asiedu ( 2002 ) , this step falls abruptly, because it merely captures the handiness and non the dependability of the substructure. Furthermore, it merely includes fixed-line substructure and non cellular ( nomadic ) telephones.
Wheeler & A ; Mody ( 1992 ) examined three variables-previous investing, substructure, and the degree of industrialization-and found them all to be signii¬?cant and positive. Woodward ( 1992 ) supported these consequences with an econometric analysis demoing that Japan ‘s outward FDI was drawn to parts with high present fabrication activity.
Regardless of the implicit in hypothesis bing empirical surveies have considered different combinations of listed above FDI determiners with assorted consequences, non merely with regard to the importance or statistical significance of these variables, but in footings of the way of the consequence. Therefore, in reexamining these surveies it is hard to deduce one list of determiners, particularly as some have gained or lost importance over clip. In order to supply a qualitative survey of FDI determiners in Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkey I tend to concentrate on the empirical surveies conducted by assorted research workers on factors of FDI influx in developing states.