A major job with VaR is that the utmost events lying at the dress suits of the normal distribution are ignored wholly. This gives false sense of security to bankers. These utmost events have a really low chance ( 1 % , or 2 % or so ) and are easy uncared for, but sometimes can turn out fatal and lead to crisis.
Taleb ( 2007 ) besides presented a new model of hazard direction wherein the focal point shifted towards ‘low chance events ‘ which might bring forth tremendous impact, if they occur. These events are by and large ignored by popular probabilistic theoretical accounts. He coined a term “ black swan events ” for these events. He elaborated black swan with an illustration of a Meleagris gallopavo which is summarised as follows:
A Meleagris gallopavo who is populating in a broad coop and is being fed decently believes that everything is in his favor and he is being taken attention of. Suddenly, one twenty-four hours he does n’t acquire any nutrient, is taken out of the coop and is eventually sent to a meatman. All his positive experiences gained in old yearss turn into one negative experience against his beliefs. Taleb ( 2007 ) calls unexpected events, like the experience of the Meleagris gallopavo, as black swan events and identifies the presence of black swan events in fiscal markets every bit good.
The construct of black swan suggests that 99 % opportunities of addition, as by and large used in theories of chance, give a incorrect feeling of really high likeliness of addition. The staying 1 % opportunity of non-occurrence, though really little, can do really high and unexpected losingss and turn a state of affairs upside down.
Loh ( 2009 ) identified some black swan illustrations like Google, facebook, wikis, 9/11 and the current fiscal crisis. Loh ( 2009 ) , Taylor and Williams ( 2008 a, B ) concluded that many a clip unthinkable, unexpected and unknown could hold high impact than what we knew. Taylor and Williams ( 2008 a, B ) linked black swan construct with 2007 fiscal crisis and found grounds from money markets particularly extremely unusual leap in spreads between nightlong inter-bank loaning rate and term London inter-bank offer rates ( Libor ) .
Risk direction is necessary for the endurance of concerns particularly Bankss which are by and large termed as catastrophe prone. Harmonizing to Miller ( 1998 ) , a Nobel Laureate, “ Banking is disaster-prone nineteenth century engineering, non easy tamed. ” Al-Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei ( 2007 ) mentioned that hazard direction is necessary for bank direction as banking is a concern of hazard. They added that Bankss in the contemporary unstable environment are confronting a assortment of hazards which may jeopardize their endurance and success.
Jacques and Nigro ( 1997 ) examined the consequence of risk-based capital criterions on bank capital and portfolio hazard. They argued that boulder clay 1997, unequal attending had been given on the consequence of risk-based capital criterions on the capital of Bankss and the hazard they assumed. Based on anterior research, their survey used a three phase least squares model to understand the association between bank capital, portfolio hazard and risk-based capital criterions and the consequences clearly suggested that the risk-based capital criterions were rather efficient in bettering capital ratios and cut downing portfolio hazard in Bankss. Doff ( 2008 ) found the importance of economic capital for hazard direction.
Basel II sets out minimal capital demand of 8 % for Bankss as a measure towards readiness for any loss that Bankss may hold to confront while Reserve Bank of India has more rigorous capital adequateness norms of 9 % .
Taleb ( 2007 ) argued that the bankers across the universe ( chiefly those of the US and the UK ) non merely ignored guarding against black swan events like the sub-prime crisis but besides promoted to the concern category, the political category and the general populace, a thought of bogus quantitative techniques that did non see the worlds of hazards in their calculations.
Stulz ( 2009 ) explained how misdirection of hazard was done by fiscal establishments including Bankss, and the misdirection eventually resulted in the clang of stock markets and major banking establishments. He explained how companies relied to a great extent on historical informations to do anticipations, and criticised day-to-day steps like VaR on the evidences that these underestimated a house ‘s exposure to markets where the market basicss were altering every minute. He showed concern that many Bankss and fiscal establishments made usage of these steps to track hazard and therefore failed.
Basel II agreement faced critical scrutiny in the aftermath of the fiscal crisis which was apparent from a unfavorable judgment that the model failed to supply for utmost events i.e. rare results ( Atik, 2009 ) . He mentioned that the utmost events were non reflected in hazard estimations produced from historical informations, but had significant effects.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision ( 2009 ) stated in “ Revisions to the Basel II market hazard model ” that the “ Amendment to the Capital Accord to integrate market hazards ” could non capture some of the of import hazards. This losing out was one of the responsible factors in the fiscal crisis. Reacting to this, BCBS did non extinguish VaR wholly but supplemented VaR based trading book method with an incremental hazard capital charge. The new method included default hazard and migration hazard, for unsecuritised recognition merchandises. The securitised merchandises were besides to be managed by ciphering the comprehensive hazard capital charge.
As per Bhide ( 2010 ) , “ Statistical theoretical accounts have deprived the fiscal sector of individual judgement that makes capitalist economy thrive. That must alter. ” He mentioned that centralization, in some ways, has led us to believe in standardized signifier with the coming of advanced statistical theoretical accounts and while giving loans, a banker saw more through a theoretical account than utilizing his personal opinion.
Dr. D. Subbarao, Governor, RBI ( 2008 ) described that there was a batch of argument on efficiency additions of fiscal technology. He showed his concern that economic experts and fiscal experts believed fiscal technology to be a rescuer through which the effects of sub-prime mortgage crisis could be nullified and the finance universe would be left with top-rated securities but the fiscal chemistry produced worst results. His following words describe ill-effects of edification through fiscal technology:
“ We should hold seen the crisis incubating behind the dazzle of fiscal chemistry. We should hold noticed the regulative systems acquiring lax and behind the curve… … … the complexness, edification and delicacy associated with it gave the fiscal sector a larger than life profile. Lulled by the apparently benign economic environment, we deluded ourselves into believing that for every existent life job, no affair how complex, there is a fiscal sector solution. ”