‘Although in theory Parliament is autonomous, the debatable world is that British constitutional agreements guarantee that true power lies with the Executive. ‘
Part A:Many states such as the United States have a written fundamental law but Britain does non, nevertheless ‘it must hold something which is at the bosom of its constitutional arrangements’ [ 1 ] and this demand is fulfilled by the philosophy of parliamentary sovereignty.
The traditional and most frequently applied definition of parliamentary sovereignty is that of Dicey, who stated, ‘the rule of parliamentary sovereignty agencies… the right to do or undo any jurisprudence whatever ; and further, that no individual or organic structure is recognised by the jurisprudence of England as holding a right to overrule or put aside the statute law of Parliament’ [ 2 ] . From this definition, three cardinal rules can be derived ; the first is that Parliament can do or undo any jurisprudence.
An illustration of this rule in pattern ; The Septennial Act 1715 was passed to widen the life of Parliament from three to seven old ages out of fright of the effects of an election. His Majesty ‘s Declaration of Abdication Act 1936 demonstrates Parliaments ability to change the line of sequence to the throne and the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 demonstrate Parliament legislation over its ain processs.
The War Damage Act 1965 overruled a House of Lords determination inBurmah Oil Company V Lord Advocate[ 1965 ] [ 3 ] and is a presentation of Parliaments ability to do or undo any jurisprudence as it was able to pass with retrospective consequence.
The 2nd rule of Dicey ‘s theory is that Parliament can non be bound by its predecessors or adhere its replacements. This affirms Thomas Paine ‘s theory that, ‘every age and coevals must be free to move for itself, in all instances as the ages and coevalss which preceded it’ [ 4 ] .Vauxhall Estates Ltd V Liverpool Corporation[ 1932 ] [ 5 ] concerned struggle between The Housing Act 1925 and the Acquisition of Land Act 1919 where it was held that the commissariats of the ulterior act would use ; this is known as ‘implied abrogation ‘ and demonstrates Parliaments inability to adhere its replacements.Ellen Streets Estates Ltd. V Minister for Health[ 1934 ] [ 6 ] besides held that the ulterior Act must use and it was stated that the purpose of Parliament to revoke the statute law must be given consequence ‘just because it is the will of the legislature’ [ 7 ] .
The 3rd basic rule of Dicey ‘s theory is that no-one can oppugn Parliaments Torahs, as Blackstone stated, ‘true it is, that what the Parliament doth, no authorization on Earth can undo’ [ 8 ] . InEdinburgh & A ; Dalkeith Railway Co v Wauchope[ 1842 ] [ 9 ] , Wauchope sought to dispute an Act of Parliament on the evidences that he was non given notice of its debut as a measure into Parliament. His challenge was rejected on the footing that the tribunals are ‘precluded from look intoing whether the proper internal processs have in fact been complied with [ 10 ] , this is known as the enrolled act regulation, affirmed inPickin V British Railways Board[ 1974 ] [ 11 ] . The tribunals can non oppugn the cogency of an Act of Parliament or declare it void ; exemplifying the function of the bench in continuing the rule of parliamentary sovereignty.
Exceptionally inR ( Jackson ) V Attorney General[ 2005 ] [ 12 ] the cogency of the Hunting Act 2004 and usage of the Parliament Act 1949 were challenged. It was affirmed that regardless of the manner an Act has been passed, even if utilizing the Parliament Acts, the tribunals can non dispute the cogency of primary statute law. HoweverJacksondid raise issues of sovereignty in pattern, Lord Hope stated, ‘the English rule of the absolute legislative sovereignty of Parliament… is being qualified’ [ 13 ] .
Parliamentary sovereignty is seemingly sustained, peculiarly by the bench and is justified in that the chief legislative House, the Commons, is democratically elected. Yet the recognition by Lord Hope inJacksonrecognises that the construct is progressively capable to restrictions.
Lord Steyn inJacksonbesides recognised the laterality of the Parks by the executive- the authorities, ‘the power of a authorities with a big bulk in the House of Commons is redoubtable’ [ 14 ] , and warned that usage of the Parliament Acts creates a danger of ‘exorbitant averment of authorities power’ [ 15 ] .
This averment of power that Lord Steyn warns of should theoretically be prevented by the constitutional rule of the separation of powers. The philosophy of the separation of powers is mostly associated with Baron Montesquieu who ‘based his celebrated expounding of the philosophy on his apprehension of the British constitution’ [ 16 ] . He identified three establishments of the province ; the legislative assembly that makes the Torahs, the executive that formulates and influences policy and the bench that adjudicates upon and imposes countenances for interrupting the jurisprudence. Montesquieu argued that the consequence of these three powers concentrated in ‘the same adult male or the same body’ [ 17 ] would present a menace to single autonomy and that to forestall inordinate concentration of public power the maps of each should be allocated clearly. However Jennings identified that Montesquieu did non intend ‘that the legislative assembly and executive should hold no influence over the other, but… that neither should exert the power of the other’ [ 18 ] . There should be a system of cheques and balances in topographic point to avoid concentration of power.
The United States is an illustration of strong separation as the written fundamental law embeds the philosophy ; the construction and power of the three establishments is laid out within Articles 1-3. Checks and balances are in topographic point to guarantee separation of power, for illustration the President ‘s proposed legislative programme is checked by Congress and the Supreme Court.
There is nevertheless, in pattern, ‘fusion ‘ between the legislative assembly and executive in the British fundamental law ; for illustration the constitutional convention that members of the executive semen from one of the Houses of Parliament, ‘the executive, far from being separated from the legislative assembly, is drawn from within its ranks’ [ 19 ] . The Prime Minister, is besides by convention a member of the House of Commons ; the legislative assembly. In contrast, in the United States the president is individually elected and may be of a different political party than the 1 with a bulk in either or both Houses of Congress.
Under the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 there is imposed a statutory bound of 95 authorities curates that may come from the House of Commons and prohibition of certain groups from going members such as civil retainers and judicial office holders. This to some extent conserves separation nevertheless through its bulk in the House of Commons the executive it is still likely to hold the ability to rule proceedings.
By convention, the political party that wins the most seats at a general election forms a authorities – the executive and a first past the station electoral system ensures that it will hold a big bulk of seats in the House of Commons. Dicey recognised this as a worrying displacement in power stating that the bulk party in the House ‘can arrogate to itself that legislative omnipotence which of right belongs to the nation’ [ 20 ] . Basically there is a concern that the executive can command the legislative domination of Parliament and guarantee that its legislative proposals are enacted.
There is besides a merger of map as the executive is involved in jurisprudence devising through delegated statute law. A big sum is made by Curates and sections of the executive refering of import affairs with justification in its efficiency compared with the passing of an Act of Parliament. It can besides be made by those with specialist cognition whilst MP ‘s may non hold the relevant expertness. However it conflicts with the theory of Parliamentary sovereignty as the executive is the supreme jurisprudence doing organic structure in footings of the sum of statute law produced. Subsequently power lies with the executive at the disbursal of the legislative assembly, ‘some have depicted this province of personal businesss as an stepping down by Parliament from its principle constitutional function in favor of the executive’ [ 21 ] .
Prerogative powers are an illustration of merger as they leave considerable power in the custodies of the executive and let Curates to pass without the consent of Parliament. However to some extent this is limited by judicial reappraisal as inR V Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fire Brigades Union[ 1995 ] [ 22 ] , where it was held that it was improper for the Home Secretary to present alterations to a strategy which were incompatible with an Act of Parliament.
The unwritten British fundamental law is based mostly on conventions and this is an of import subscriber to merger between the legislative assembly and executive. Although in theory Parliament is autonomous, in pattern this legislative domination of Parliament is efficaciously inherited by the executive – giving it true power.
The constitutional theoretician Walter Bagehot argues that far from being a job, this amalgamate relationship had clear virtues, ‘the efficient secret of the English Constitution may be described as the stopping point brotherhood, the about complete merger, of the executive and legislative powers ‘ . [ 23 ] Lord Hailsham used the term ‘elective dictatorship’ [ 24 ] , to knock the manner in which the executive may command the legislative assembly.
Part B:In visible radiation of this, it is to be critically evaluated to what extent this merger is debatable ; whether the cheques and balances as prescribed by the philosophy of the separation of powers are effectual plenty to forestall maltreatment of power by the executive ; in peculiar Parliamentary examination.
There is a concern that the ‘Government in general is excessively dominant over parliamentary proceedings’ [ 25 ] such as the Parliamentary timetable and legislative procedure. The bulk of Bills considered by Parliament will be introduced by the executive and derive from its policy committednesss. With its strong bulk in Parliament the executive is later able to procure its policies into jurisprudence and this is predominately through control of its members instead than ‘active battle with the issues’ [ 26 ] .A Party members are told by authorities whips to vote in conformity with the party line and are improbable to divert from this demand as back uping the party is good ; they are more likely to be promoted to a place within the executive. Almost all measures are approved by each House even if they are amended and by convention the Queen can non decline the royal acquiescence.
Delegated statute law such as statutory instruments and orders in council are besides a important illustration of the legislative power of the executive ; in peculiar ‘Henry VIII clauses ‘ of the parent act leting statutory instruments to alter the primary statute law itself. It is argued that these clauses go ‘right to the bosom of the cardinal constitutional inquiry of the bounds of executive power’ [ 27 ] . The Legislative Regulatory Reform Bill ( LRRB ) when introduced into Parliament contained many of these clauses which would hold enabled Curates to do delegated statute law amending, revoking or replacing primary or secondary statute law. It was termed the ‘abolition of Parliament measure ‘ because of the power it would give to Ministers ; it besides proposed restrictions on Parliamentary examination of these actions by Curates.
Parliamentary examination of the executive is of ‘fundamental importance in guaranting that the authorities acts under the jurisprudence and in conformity with the rules of constitutionalism and democracy’ [ 28 ] . John Locke ‘s theory of the ‘consent of the governed’ [ 29 ] is such that a authorities ‘s legitimacy to utilize province power is merely justified and legal when derived from the people. Therefore the executive should be accountable to Parliament, as a representative of the electorate.
The theoretical underpinning of this answerability is the convention of ministerial duty. Corporate duty is such that Curates must publically O.K. the Cabinets determinations or resign ; this serves to beef up the executive farther by ever demoing a united forepart but does non heighten transparence. Individually Ministers must bear duty for the actions of their sections. There are assorted scrutiny mechanisms used to keep the executive and its Curates to account for their actions ; nevertheless their effectivity is frequently dubious.
Ministerial Question Time enables Members of Parliament to oppugn authorities Curates in the House of Commons. This method of obtaining information and size uping the actions of the executive is ‘not a self-generated affair’ [ 30 ] as there is notice given of the inquiries to be asked. However there is strength in that the replies given are recorded and later go a portion of public records. The Ministerial Code lineations that ‘ministers give accurate and true information to Parliament’ [ 31 ] and that ‘ministers should be every bit unfastened as possible with Parliament and the public’ [ 32 ] supplying steadfast ordinance on the replies to be given. Question Time is televised and it is arguable that this is successful at supplying public penetration of the executive being held to account. However it is debatable as the televised component leads to a theatrical and superficial occasion.A Parliament may confront trouble in oppugning the executive as there are assorted limitations on the types of inquiries that can be asked ; Curates are merely questioned on affairs straight within their duty, with some topics excluded wholly such as the ‘personal powers of the sovereign ‘ and ‘defence and national security’ [ 33 ] . Curates can besides decline to reply inquiries on evidences including cost of obtaining the information or whether the inquiry is in the public involvement. They can besides decline to reply certain inquiries under the limitations in the Freedom of Information Act 2000. Furthermore, if a Minister refuses to reply a inquiry they can non be pressed to reply it. These restrictions on oppugning are hence debatable and prevent proper examination ; ‘the obtaining of information, by MPs on behalf of their components, lies at the bosom of the examination procedure… ill-informed argument will non be effective’ [ 34 ] . As inquiries are non limited to the resistance party it is arguable that as ‘sycophantic inquiries are often asked’ [ 35 ] Question Time is used by the executive to advance its ain positions and party accomplishments. This does nevertheless hold the benefit of raising party morale and assurance in seeing the party leaders perform good in Parliament. Although this so becomes more about the political relationship instead than scrutiny, with the parties seeking to expose failings in each other. Written inquiries are arguably a more effectual mechanism for obtaining information instead than unwritten inquiries. The ‘Cash for Questions ‘ dirt was besides debatable as Members were being paid to postpone certain inquiries for Curates and hence non efficaciously size uping their actions. Its repute for keeping Curates to account was besides slightly ruined.
For Prime Minister ‘s Question Time inquiries are notified in authorship and this first formal, unfastened inquiry is normally to inquire the Prime Ministers battles for the twenty-four hours supplying ‘a impersonal nog on which to hang a auxiliary, and existent, question’ [ 36 ] .A The broad scope of auxiliary inquiries asked, without notice, means the Prime Minister needs to be able ‘to show his competency across a full scope of authorities policy’ [ 37 ] and this spontaneousness provides stronger examination. However Prime Ministers Question Time is allocated merely 30 proceedingss per hebdomad ; supplying a really short sum of clip for oppugning.
Assorted arguments on the floor of the House of Commons are besides an chance for examination. They are frequently used to show the position of an single Member and the support for this position pulling public involvement and media coverage ; later force per unit area is placed on the authorities to react depending on its support. However arguments are ‘limited by the adversary model in which they are held’ [ 38 ] and Curates are frequently non to be questioned on their responses which is debatable as it prevents deeper oppugning on the issues. A ballot on a gesture of no assurance is arguably the most effectual at keeping the executive to account ; if the authorities is defeated the convention is that it must vacate or seek disintegration of Parliament and name a general election. Parliament hence does hold ultimate power in retreating its assurance nevertheless this is non truly a menace due to party subject ; it is more likely to be of influence on the authorities. A ballot of no assurance is rare and even more seldom successful ; the last clip a authorities lost such a ballot was in 1979 where the Callaghan Government resigned and called a general election.
Choice commissions ‘examine the outgo, disposal and policy of the chief authorities departments’ [ 39 ] and besides look into other affairs of public involvement or concern. They are composed, by convention, of backbenchers and this theoretically increases their independency, they are besides free to make up one’s mind which affairs to look into without authorities blessing. Choice commissions besides have the power to ‘send for individuals, documents and records’ [ 40 ] to help in their work and frequently provide extremely influential studies, nevertheless they are possibly more successful in pulling media and later public attending to issues of importance. The party whips besides ‘have great influence, if non entire control, over membership’ [ 41 ] chairmanship is unfastened to any party and it is hence possible it will be chaired by an executive party member – making the job of farther laterality within the commission. Committees can besides merely look into a little proportion of the activities of the section as they are constrained by clip and with each section holding its ain commission ; it is more hard to look into issues that cut across several sections. They are besides merely capable of reding on affairs and with no powers to enforce countenances, this is debatable as it does non let active control. Choice commissions are besides capable to several restrictions, such as that there is no duty that the authorities should collaborate with them ; when the choice commission on defense mechanism started its enquiry into the ‘Westland Helicopter matter ‘ , the authorities refused to let informants from the Department of Trade and Industry to give grounds. They justified this in stating that giving grounds would hold major deductions for the behavior and dealingss of the authorities. Civil retainers have frequently been forbidden from looking on the evidences of ‘national security or inordinate cost’ [ 42 ] . This is debatable as the executive is protected from existent examination by ‘shielding the interior workings of government’ [ 43 ] .
Britain ‘s unwritten fundamental law is debatable as its footing on conventions enables the executive to inherit the legal sovereignty of Parliament and later it is ‘the dominant establishment to which the other two establishments react’ [ 44 ] . Parliamentary examination does non command the executive, it simply reacts when necessary. This is debatable as it is one of the cheques and balances in topographic point to forestall the concentration of power that Montesquieu warned would be a ‘threat to liberty ‘ . The executive frequently appears to mistreat its power through its laterality of the legislative procedure to go through statute law for its benefit and even rule the mechanisms for its ain examination. Lord Hailsham ‘s description of an ‘elective absolutism ‘ appears to be the debatable world.
[ 1 ] Broadbent, G. , Public Law Directions, ( 2009 ) , A p.50
[ 2 ] Dicey, A.V, An Introduction to the Law of the Constitution, ( 1885 ) , p.38
[ 3 ] AC 75
[ 4 ] Paine, T. , Rights of Man, ( 1987 ) , p.204
[ 5 ] 1 KB 733
[ 6 ] 1 KB 590
[ 7 ] Ibid at p.597 per Maugham LJ
[ 8 ] Blackstone, W. , A Commentaries on the Laws of England ( 1765-69 )
[ 9 ] 8 Cl & A ; Fin 710
[ 10 ] Alder, J. , Constitutional and Administrative Law, ( 2007 ) , p. 201
[ 11 ] AC 765
[ 12 ] UKHL 56
[ 13 ] Ibid at [ 104 ] per Lord Hope
[ 14 ] Ibid at [ 71 ] per Lord Steyn
[ 15 ] Ibid at [ 101 ] per Lord Steyn
[ 16 ] Barendt, E. , ‘Separation of powers and constitutional authorities ‘ , ( 1995 ) Win Public Law 599 at p.599
[ 17 ] Montesquieu, De l’Esprit diethylstilbestrols Lois, ( 1794 ) p.165
[ 18 ] Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, ( 1959 ) App. 1
[ 19 ] Barnett, H. , Constitutional and Administrative Law, ( 2009 ) , p.83
[ 20 ] Weill, R. , ‘Dicey was non Diceyan ‘ , ( 2003 ) 62 Cambridge Law Journal 474 at p.490
[ 21 ] De Smith, S.A. , Constitutional and Administrative Law, ( 1977 ) , p.321
[ 22 ] [ 1995 ] 2 A.C. 513
[ 23 ] Bagehot, W. , The English Constitution, ( 1867 ) p.12
[ 24 ] Lord Hailsham, Elective Dictatorship ( 1976 )
[ 25 ] Reform of the House of Commons Select Committee, First Report, Rebuilding the House, A ( November 2009 ) parity. 23
[ 26 ] Wright, T. , British Politicss: A Very Short Introduction, ( 2003 ) , p.88
[ 27 ] HL Deb Vol. 643 col. 165 14 January 2003
[ 28 ] Barnett op. cit. , p.385
[ 29 ] Locke, J. , Two Treatises of Government, ( 1824 ) , p.215
[ 30 ] Barnett op. cit. , p.386
[ 31 ] Cabinet Office, The Ministerial Code, ( July 2007 ) , p.6
[ 32 ] Ibid
[ 33 ] Erskine May, 1997, Ch.17
[ 34 ] Hough, B. , ‘Ministerial responses to parliamentary inquiries: some recent concerns ‘ , ( 2003 ) Sum Public Law 211 at p.211
[ 35 ] Alder op. cit. , at p. 306
[ 36 ] Barnett, op. cit. , at p. 387
[ 37 ] Barnett, op. cit. , at p. 499
[ 38 ] Bradley, A.W. , Ewing, K.D. , Constitutional and Administrative Law, ( 2007 ) , p. 217
[ 39 ] Standing Orders of the House of Commons, ( 2009 ) , at p. 150
[ 40 ] Ibid at p. 156
[ 41 ] Barnett, op.cit. , at p. 393
[ 42 ] Cabinet Office, Departmental Evidence and Response to Select Committees, ( 2005 ) at parity. 70
[ 43 ] Alder op. cit. , at p. 310
[ 44 ] Griffin, J.A.G. , ‘The Common Law and the Political Constitution ‘ ( 2001 ) 117 Law Quarterly