A mortgage is a contract between two parties whereby the mortgager uses his land as security for a loan from the mortgage holder. In return for the creative activity of a proprietary involvement in the land for the mortgage holder, the mortgager receives a loan and based on the footings of the mortgage has to pay the full amount owed. In the event that the mortgager defaults on payment, the mortgage holder is entitled to take ownership of the mortgaged belongings and retrieve the full amount owed by the mortgager normally through the sale of the belongings and by actioning on the compact to pay the full amount due. Jack and Margaret entered into a mortgage contract with Reading Bank whereby their marital place was used as security for the loan. As Jack has fallen into arrears with respect to the mortgage payments, Reading Bank is now seeking to retrieve the full amount due under the mortgage.
Mortgagee ‘s Rights
The mortgager basically has the cumulative rights [ 1 ] to action the mortgager on the compact to refund based on the mortgage contract [ 2 ] , to take ownership of the mortgaged belongings, to originate and complete sale of the mortgaged belongings, to exert foreclosure and to name a receiving system. In this undertaking we are merely concerned with the mortgager ‘s right to ownership as Margaret and Jack are defying ownership. By virtuousness of the manner in which legal mortgages are created, the mortgage holder is regarded as holding an estate in land and this along with the authorization of Four Maids v. Dudley Marshall [ 3 ] and Ropaigelach v Barclays Bank [ 4 ] gives Reading Bank the immediate right to possession “ the minute the ink is dry on the mortgage. “ [ 5 ] The right to take ownership is capable merely to self restriction as expressed in contract and statutory limitations. Mortgage paperss by and large contain a compact that would curtail the mortgage holder from taking ownership unless the mortgager is in arrears, it appears that an statement for self restriction compacts would neglect. With respect to statutory limitations on the right of ownership a mortgager, protection for the mortgager is afforded by subdivision 36 of the Administration of Justice Act 1970 ( AJA ) as amended by Section 8 of the AJA 1973. By virtuousness of subdivision 36 of the AJA the tribunal is granted a discretional power to suspend, recess or prorogue an application for ownership of a home house by the mortgage holder if it appears that the mortgager would be probably in a sensible period of clip to pay any amounts due under the mortgage. Whether or non Margaret and Jack can defy ownership by virtuousness of subdivision 36 would depend on whether or non they satisfy the restrictions of the consequence of the legislative act. There is no difference as to whether the mortgaged house in inquiry is a home house nevertheless the facts of the instance seem to bespeak that as Reading bank did non use for a tribunal order [ 6 ] and alternatively sought self aid [ 7 ] as the bank simply wrote to Jack and Margaret. It should be noted that when seeking ego aid ownership Reading Bank runs the hazard of perpetrating condemnable offenses if there should be any individual legitimately shacking on the premises at the clip as they are capable to Section 6 ( 1 ) of the Criminal Law Act 1977 ( if force was used or had been threatened to be used ) . However the facts are soundless, if Reading Bank did in fact apply for a tribunal order Margaret and Jack will be able to trust on subdivision 36 of the AJA and they would hold to turn out on the balance of chances that it is likely that the arrears will be cleared within a sensible period [ 8 ] in order to fulfill the tribunal. Application of subdivision 36 is non needfully a negative result as mortgage holders do non desire ownership or the disbursal of a sale. “ A ownership order under subdivision 36 gives the mortgage holder all it could inquire for: an order for ownership, albeit suspended and an order necessitating the borrower to refund the arrears and to lodge to a agenda for future payments. “ [ 9 ] The discretion as to whether to use for a tribunal order or non is left to Reading Bank.
As a mortgage is basically a contract and the presence of any corrupting factors such as undue influence or deceit may do the full understanding nothingness and therefore unenforceable. The tribunal of entreaty in Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. v. Aboody [ 10 ] set out the classification of instances undue influence into either category 1 of existent undue influence whereby one party to the dealing can turn out on the facts that the other party to the dealing exerted undue influence through an act openly carried out amounting to improper force per unit area. And category 2 of presumed undue influence [ 11 ] which arises when the plaintiff is able to set up the being of a relationship of trust and assurance between her and the offender of such a nature that it is just to assume that the offender abused the relationship in securing her understanding to come in into the impugned dealing [ 12 ] In order to defy ownership Margaret would most likely effort to reason that undue influence had in fact been exercised. The load of cogent evidence for undue influence lies on the claimant throughout [ 13 ] . Margaret would hold to turn out undue influence, either really or with the benefit of an evidentiary illation ( a given ) , which remains un-rebutted. As category 1 can non win the load of cogent evidence would be on Margaret to trust on category 2 in that of the given of undue influence. Royal Bank of Scotland V Etridge ( No.2 ) [ 14 ] indicates that in order to dispatch the load of cogent evidence, the victim has to demo that there was a relationship of trust and assurance with the alleged offender and that there exists a ‘transaction that calls for an account ‘ . [ 15 ] Using the demands of Etridge ( no.2 ) for category 2 presumed undue influence to the facts of the instance, it would be necessary for Margaret to turn out that at that place existed a close relationship of ‘habitual trust and assurance ‘ between and Jack ( the alleged offender ) and herself. On the facts it appears that Margaret ‘reposed trust and assurance ‘ [ 16 ] in Jack, the fact that for a great many old ages Margaret was a homemaker raising five kids seems to bespeak that Jack would be left entirely to pull off the fiscal determinations of the family every bit good as the company. On the premise that Jack was in fact in control of the fiscal determinations it would look that he would hold a sufficient place of power to mistreat his influence over Margaret as is evidenced by his actions of persistently coercing [ 17 ] her into subscribing the mortgage despite her obvious reluctance to re-mortgage the house which clearly indicates a treachery of trust by seeking to carry through his ain involvements. [ 18 ] When sing the dealing that calls for account it is submitted that it would be left to the discretion of the tribunals, the judgement could travel either manner. On one manus it can be argued the dealing is obviously disadvantageous to Margaret as she undertakes a serious fiscal duty, and in return she personally receives nil. On the other manus it can be argued that Jack ‘s concern is the primary beginning of the household income and Margaret would reciprocally profit from holding a lively involvement in making what she can to back up the concern. However the facts point out that Margaret was loath to hold to the dealing and merely did so at a point where she was ‘physically exhausted ‘ and ‘sick of disputing ‘ . Jack had besides misrepresented Margaret with respect to the existent amount that was to be borrowed, the sum was represented as & A ; lb ; 300,000 where else it was in fact for & A ; lb ; 500,000. It is submitted that in visible radiation of this it the tribunals would most likely infer that there was undue influence as the dealing will merely be explicable on the footing that it has been procured by the exercising of undue influence by Jack. If the tribunals infer that Margaret ‘s consent has in fact been procured by undue influence or deceit, the bank may non trust on her evident consent unless it has good ground to believe that she understands the nature and consequence of the dealing. The load of cogent evidence will be on the bank to refute the given of undue influence. The Bank can refute the given by bring forthing an account for the impugned dealing [ 19 ] . Lord Nicholls in Etridge ( no.2 ) [ 20 ] indicates that this can be done if Reading Bank can demo that Margaret obtained independent advice from a canvasser or outside adviser [ 21 ] . In this instance, the facts are soundless as to whether or non Margaret obtained any independent advice. In the event that the Margaret has obtained independent advice it would be in the tribunals discretion as to whether or non the given can be rebutted. However if Margaret did non obtain independent advice it is submitted that the tribunals will most likely infer that undue influence had been exerted on Margaret by Jack defiling her consent with respect to the impugned dealing. If the tribunals in their discretion infer that undue influence had in fact been exerted so the burden of dispatching the load will be placed on Reading Bank. The judgement of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Barclays Bank v O’Brien [ 22 ] appears to bespeak that the married woman would merely be able to put aside the dealing on the evidences of undue influence if ‘the third party had existent notice of the facts giving rise to her equity ‘ . The determination in Etridge ( No.2 ) [ 23 ] indicates that the tribunals will merely hold the mortgage holder to hold notice of undue influence in every dealing where the surety and debitor are in a non-commercial relationship and the loan made was non for the common benefit of both parties but alternatively for the exclusive intent of one. Using the rules to the facts of the instance at manus, Margaret and Jack are in a domestic relationship and Margaret is besides listed as a manager of the company. As aforementioned the tribunals will merely be able to put aside the mortgage on the evidences of undue influence if the Bank had existent notice of the facts giving rise to Margaret ‘s equity. The instance of CIBC mortgages v Pitt illustrates a state of affairs whereby the bank was misled by the mortgager to believe that the loan was to buy a vacation place, as it was for the common benefit of the twosome the Bank was non put on enquiry. Jack sought the mortgage in order to spread out his concern and every bit aforementioned an statement for manifest disadvantage could travel either manner. Reading bank may reason that as Margaret was a listed manager of the company they could use CIBC v Pitt whereby the mortgage holder was non put on notice as it was for their common benefit. However on the other side of the coin Lord Nicholls in Etridge ( No.2 ) stated: “ In my position the bank is put on enquiry in such instances, even when the married woman is a manager or secretary of the company. “ [ 24 ] This suggests that the fact that Margaret is a listed manager on her hubbies company should non queer Reading Bank from being put on enquiry. The statement for manifest disadvantage could travel either manner as Margaret has ne’er played an active portion in her hubbies concern and alternatively was busy raising her five childs and later working as a nurse. There seems to be no manner by which the bank can avoid being put on notice to dispatch their duties to forestall the dealing from going impugned. In order to avoid rendering the mortgage nothingness due to undue influence Reading Bank is advised to run into with the vulnerable party in private where by the extent and hazards involved in the mortgage should be explained after which the vulnerable party should be instructed to seek independent legal advice in order to obtain a verification missive. A verification missive from Margaret ‘s canvassers acts as cogent evidence that Reading Bank has fulfilled their duties and duties in guaranting that the vulnerable party has obtain independent advise. Continuing with the mortgage after a canvassers verification missive has been obtained will do the mortgage virtually unaffected by any future supplications for undue influence. The facts of the instance are soundless as to whether or non Reading Bank has carried out its duties in that of run intoing Margaret in private and teaching her to seek independent legal advice to obtain a verification missive. In the event that a verification missive had been sought any supplication for undue influence would be ignored and the Reading Bank ‘s rights would be unhampered. However if Reading Bank had failed to dispatch their duties and the tribunals inferred that undue influence had been procured onto Margaret so Reading Bank would non be entitled to ownership as the mortgage would merely be exercisable upon Jack. This would ensue in Reading Bank holding to seek other redresss to recognize the loan such as actioning on the compact to pay.
It appears that a supplication for undue influence would most probably win as Reading Bank has failed to dispatch its responsibilities and duties such as telling a private meeting and reding Margaret to seek independent legal advice. However the facts are soundless, If Reading Bank failed to dispatch their responsibilities, the mortgage understanding would be deemed unenforceable [ 25 ] on Margaret nevertheless Reading Bank would still be able to action Jack on the compact to refund based on the mortgage contract [ 26 ] . If Reading Bank did in fact discharge their responsibilities and duties they would be able to put aside the given of undue influence. This would let Reading Bank to exert its rights under the mortgage such as right to ownership, right to sale, right to name a receiving system, right to foreclosure and compensate to action on the compact to refund. With respect to compensate to possession Reading Bank would hold the discretion as to whether to utilize apply for a tribunal order or non as aforementioned the supplication of subdivision 36 of the AJA is non needfully a negative result, it all depends on what Reading bank truly wants.