Literature Overview Of The Hedge Fund Industry Finance Essay

Introduction

The last 15 old ages witnessed a singular increasing investors ‘ involvement in alternate investings that leads the hedge fund industry to one of the fastest turning sectors in term of plus under direction ( AuM ) and in term of figure of financess in the whole fiscal industry. Credit Suisse/Tremont Index estimates the entire industry AuM at $ 1.5 trillion as of March 2010[ 1 ]. Hedgefundresearch estimated the entire figure of hedge financess at about 9000 in mid-2009. Harmonizing to the direction adviser house Casey Quirk, the industry AuM expended at more than 20 % per twelvemonth between 2000 and mid-2008 but suffered important escapes during the fiscal crisis. Casey Quirk forecasts that hedge fund assets will achieve about $ 2.6 trillion by the terminal of 2013, after making their low point during the subprime crisis in 2009.

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Besides the possible historical and demographic factors[ 2 ], the grounds behind this outstanding development prevarication in the specific risk-return features and investing chances of hedge financess returns. With higher risk-adjusted returns and lower correlativity with “ traditional ” plus categories ( Agarwal and Naik [ 2000b ] ; Brown et Al. [ 1999 ] ; Capocci and Hubner [ 2004 ] ) , hedge financess give investors the possibility to increase their return on investing and diversify their portfolio. These features attracted ever more and more institutional and private investors looking for intelligence investing chances with lower systematic hazards, higher returns or variegation potency. Large incentive-based fees on returns have attracted superb directors with superior stock picking accomplishments and many hedge financess are built around fiscal masterminds working in an environment in which they can thrive ( Agarwal and Naik [ 2000a ] and [ 2000b ] , or Brown and Goetzmann [ 2003 ] ) . Indeed, fudge financess normally benefit from favourable revenue enhancement statute law and are located in “ revenue enhancement celestial spheres ” states ( Brown et al. [ 1999 ] ) . Furthermore, because many regulators do non let hedge financess to publicize ( Brown et al. [ 1999 ] ) , investors frequently decide to put in a certain hedge fund by looking at the past public presentation and presuming that this is an good index for outstanding director and superior hereafter returns ( Schaub [ 2008 ] ) . High and stable public presentation is hence highly of import for directors to guarantee the lastingness of their financess.

With millions of dollars invested in this industry during the last decennary, one may say that investings chances for directors become rare and that the alpha production is capable to diminishing returns to scale. “ As new money flows into the hedge fund industry and more hedge financess are built, directors might be forced non merely to put into the most profitable schemes but to choose for less attractive investings or diversify to other schemes, where their cognition and experience might be limited ”[ 3 ]. These worsening returns to graduated table are frequently interpreted as grounds of capacity restraints in the hedge fund industry. The capacity restraint is agreed for common financess ( Clark [ 2003 ] ; Hedges [ 2003 ] ; Herzberg and Mozes [ 2003 ] ) but less established within the hedge fund industry. There exists presents a contradiction refering the development of hedge fund performances over clip. Some recent surveies suggest that hedge fund alpha has decreased while others put frontward that alpha is stable and do non happen grounds of a capacity restraint in the hedge fund industry. In peculiar, two chief surveies disagree sing their decision. By analysing the distribution of single hedge financess alpha, Zhong [ 2008 ] finds that non merely the mean alpha has decreased over clip. They observe that the figure of financess bring forthing a positive alpha is lower over clip whereas the figure of financess bring forthing negative alpha is stable. On the contrary, Ammann, Huber and Schmid [ 2009 ] can non corroborate based on their ain multifactor theoretical accounts a systematic lessening of the alpha over clip. Interrupting down the relationship between fund flows and alpha, they can non corroborate the being of capacity restraints in the hedge fund industry. The aim of this maestro thesis is to look into where these divergencies in development of hedge fund alphas come from. Both documents are based on different methodological analysiss, theoretical accounts and databases that could explicate such disparities in decision. My suggestion is first to retroflex both surveies to use methodological analysiss and features of one paper individually on the other to insulate the possible grounds explicating the different findings, and frailty versa.

The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of hedge fund history and features. Section 3 describes the literature overview refering the hedge fund industry. Section 4 and subdivision 5 presents the methodological analysiss and the reproductions of Zhong [ 2008 ] and Ammann, Huber and Schmid [ 2009 ] severally. Section Thirty presents the impact of databases, period of clip, prejudices on hedge fund public presentations. Section Thirty presents the difference in databases that could explicate the contradiction. Section XXX concludes this maestro thesis with aˆ¦

Overview of the hedge fund industry

To place why the development of this industry has been so enormous, one needs to specify the features of hedge financess. The first hedge fund was created by Alfred Winslow Jones in 1949 ( Loomis [ 1966 ] ) . He raised $ 100’000 and founded an equity long/short fund as a general partnership to avoid the SEC ordinance and maximise its portfolio ‘s investings flexibleness. Making immense net incomes, his attack was reproduced by other hedge fund directors who built new investing schemes depending on bull or bear market environments. After a lag in the 1970s and early 1980s, the popularity of hedge financess was revived in 1986 by an article in Institutional Investor ( Rohrer [ 1986 ] ) about the terrific public presentation of Julian Robertson ‘s Tiger Fund[ 4 ]. The singular development of this alternate investing category started in mid-1990 with the alleged “ aureate age ” of global-macro financess and their aggressive and market directional stakes without specific fudging schemes. Some of these hedge financess emerged as major participants in fiscal markets and attracted widespread media attending. Their directors take highly aggressive places to increase the net incomes, lending to fiscal instability like the George Soros ‘s Quantum Fund[ 5 ]and the depreciation of the British lbs in 1992. Compared with the 600 hedge financess worldwide and the less than $ 20 billion of plus under direction in 1990, the development represents harmonizing to Casey Quirk a little more than 24 % of implied one-year growing during the last 20 old ages.

The deficiency of precise legal definition for “ hedge fund ” can take to contradictions and misunderstandings. To understand the grounds why Zhong [ 2008 ] and Ammann et Al. [ 2009 ] use some specific methods, one needs to separate hedge financess from other common or common investing financess. Harmonizing to Lhabitant [ 2002 ] , the term “ hedge fund ” merely describes an investing construction or manner. We can specify common features shared by hedge financess and specific to this industry[ 6 ]. First, hedge financess are actively managed. This means that directors seek to add value through active direction and skill-based schemes. They do non seek to retroflex a peculiar benchmark like common fund directors but alternatively seek absolute returns. Second, hedge financess are securitized trading floor non really different than traditional trading floor of investing Bankss. Third, hedge financess have flexible investing policies. To accomplish higher returns and net income from arbitrage chances, hedge financess directors are given greater option sing the methods, investing techniques and plus categories they can utilize. This is non uncommon to see hedge financess using high purchase, derived functions, purchasing on border and/or short merchandising. Fourth, hedge financess use unusual legal constructions to avoid ordinances and minimise their revenue enhancement measures. There are frequently limited partnerships and offshore companies established in tax-favorable legal powers. Fifth, hedge financess have limited liquidness. Fund directors by and large limit the subscription and salvation possibilities to investors and put a minimal period investing to avoid large liquidness buffer and concentrate their investings on illiquid assets and mispricing. Sixth, hedge financess charge public presentation fees and aim absolute returns. In opposite to traditional financess, hedge financess charge non entirely a direction fee ( by and large between 1 % and 3 % of the plus under direction ) but besides an incentive fee from 15 % to 25 % of the one-year realized public presentation that aims at promoting directors to accomplish maximal returns. Furthermore, this aligns their involvements with investors. Seventh, hedge fund directors are spouses and non employees. They by and large portion both upside and downside hazards with investors by puting their personal interest in the fund and cut downing bureau jobs. Eighth, hedge financess have limited transparence. It is hard to acquire a precise overview of their investings behind the net plus value. The peculiar legal construction and seaward enrollment restrict entree to their investing policies and fund directors keep the secrets about their specific places and schemes. Finally 9th, fudge financess cater specific investors like high net worth private investors and institutional investors with big minimal capital investing and complex investing schemes. These investors are supposed to be intelligent adequate to measure their ain investings ‘ hazards. Lhabitant [ 2002 ] does non claim that this list of features to the full describes hedge financess but it gives us an first-class definition of this industry. Furthermore, it gives us a big description of the specific hedge financess returns form that helps us to understand why hedge financess surveies contain specific features.

Literature Overview

The hedge fund industry is based on the hunt for alpha, the extra risk-adjusted return. To measure the foundation and look into the hardiness of our both surveies, one needs to reexamine the recent academic literature on hedge financess. Because of their assorted specific features and the increasing involvement for alternate investings, hedge fund research has been an highly popular subject among academic bookmans and investing Bankss during the last decennary. There exists a huge literature on hedge fund public presentation and alpha based on different factor theoretical accounts.

The first surveies on hedge financess such as Schneeweis [ 1996 ] and Fung and Hsieh [ 1996 ] emphasized that hedge financess and Commodity Trading Advisers have diverse investing form and chances than common and traditional stock and bond financess. Fung and Hsieh [ 1997 ] built one of the first multi-factor theoretical accounts to benchmark and place hedge fund public presentations. Based on Sharpe [ 1992 ] plus category factor theoretical account for common financess ‘ public presentation ascription, they found “ five chief investing manners in hedge financess, which when added to Sharpe ‘s [ 1992 ] factor theoretical account can supply an incorporate model for manner analysis of both buy-and-hold and dynamic trading schemes ”[ 7 ]. The proposal that hedge fund returns can be evaluated with multiple factor theoretical accounts was hence drawn-out during the last decennary. Schneeweis and Spurgin [ 1998 ] built one of the first plus category multi-factor theoretical accounts based on inactive places in the trade good, fixed income, equity and currency markets to benchmark hedge fund returns. Agarwal and Naik [ 1999 ] find that simple option long and short schemes can explicate a important portion of fluctuation in hedge fund returns. They propose an plus category multi-factor theoretical account based on stepwise arrested development techniques to reflect the dynamic trading schemes of hedge financess integrating exposure to equities, bonds, currencies and trade goods. They found low correlativity between hedge fund returns and traditional plus categories proposing that a certain degree of variegation is imaginable for investors working a combination of alternate and inactive investing schemes. These attacks differ from financess comparing used by Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft [ 1999 ] who compared hedge fund public presentations to market indices and classified common financess. They notice that hedge financess have higher Sharpe ratios ( Sharpe [ 1994 ] ) than common financess but non needfully than market indices. Liang [ 1999 ] besides finds than fudge financess outperform common financess in term of Sharpe ratios and demo positive unnatural returns for the late 1890ss. Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson [ 1999 ] examined the public presentation of hedge fund industry and its continuity during the 1890ss. They found low correlativity with the U.S. stock market, high abrasion rates of financess and continuity in risk-adjusted returns over clip. Schneeweis, Kazemi and Martin [ 2003 ] comparison multiple factor theoretical accounts and individual factor theoretical account and happen out that hedge fund public presentation is sensitive to the pick of theoretical account. They conclude that multi-factor theoretical accounts that gaining control return fluctuations may be superior to other attacks.

The proposal that hedge fund returns exhibit non-linear final payments was developed by Fung and Hsieh [ 1997 ] and [ 2000a ] . They observe that hedge fund returns occur from three factors: ( 1 ) Trading scheme factors which show the non-linear option-like exposures to bond, equity, trade good and currency categories ; ( 2 ) Location factors which show final payments from Buy-and-Hold schemes ; and ( 3 ) Leverage factors. Agarwal and Naik [ 2000 ] propose “ a general plus category factor theoretical account including extra returns on option-based schemes and on buy-and-hold schemes to benchmark the public presentation of hedge financess ”[ 8 ]. Interestingly, they find that merely 38 % of hedge financess have added value in the first portion of the 1890ss whereas merely 28 % in the 2nd portion of the 1890ss proposing a possible diminution of hedge fund performances over clip. Mitchell and Pulvino [ 2001 ] survey hedge fund returns and claim that analysis including the non-linearity in final payments gives a more accurate description of the risk-adjusted returns. Fung and Hsieh [ 2004 ] reject conventional theoretical accounts and suggest an APT-like factor theoretical account with time-varying betas that gaining control dynamic hazard factors in hedge financess, utilizing the asset-based manner ( ABS ) factors in Fund and Hsieh [ 2002b ] . The seven factors explain a important portion of the systematic fluctuation of hedge fund returns with up to 90 % R-squared. A more accurate description of the theoretical account is given in the following subdivision as we will use it in the empirical consequences subdivision to retroflex Zhong [ 2008 ] . They find a alteration in magnitude and significance of hedge fund alphas depending on bull or bear market, meaning an development of hedge fund performances over clip.

Refering a possible capacity restraint within the industry, Liang [ 1999 ] finds a positive relationship between monthly returns and fund assets under direction. He notices a negative relationship with fund age, financess with short history surpassing financess with longer history. Edwards and Caglayan [ 2001 ] analyze hedge fund risk-adjusted returns with regard to fund sizes from January 1990 to August 1998. They find on norm a positive important alpha and grounds of continuity for positive and negative surplus returns at a worsening rate as fund sizes addition, proposing a likely capacity restraint within the industry. Gregoriou and Rouah [ 2003 ] study the nexus between the size of hedge financess and their risk-adjusted public presentations. Using the geometric mean, the Sharpe [ 1994 ] ratio and the Treynor [ 1965 ] ratio, they do non happen a positive or negative correlativity between hedge fund sizes and returns. They conclude that fund size has no impact on its public presentation. Kazemi and Schneeweis [ 2003 ] show that in norm, larger financess underperform smaller financess on return positions, have lower hazard, and lower risk-adjusted returns. The consequences can differ depending on the schemes with positive correlativity between financess size and public presentations for amalgamation arbitrage financess for illustration. Ammann and Moerth [ 2005 ] analyze the impact of fund sizes on hedge fund returns, alphas and Sharpe ratios. Using cross-sectional arrested developments, they find a negative relationship between fund sizes and returns except for extreme little financess. Ammann and Moerth [ 2008 ] refined their survey about the possible impact of hedge fund sizes on public presentations with a percentiles-based methodological analysis. They use an plus category factors model to explicate hedge fund public presentations. Their empirical consequences suggest that smaller hedge financess outperform bigger financess, with a coefficient of the variable “ size ” important at a 1 % significance degree. In contrast, larger hedge financess have on norm lower Sharpe ratios and lower variableness. Furthermore, Ammann and Moerth [ 2008 ] look into the relationship between fund flows and public presentations. They found that big influxs in hedge financess are followed by lower public presentations of these financess in the undermentioned 12-month period than hedge financess witnessing weaker influxs or escapes. They suggest that hedge financess are capable to capacity restraint whereas strong plus growing has a negative impact on future fund public presentation. Fung, Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai [ 2008 ] investigate if the public presentations, hazard and capital formation of funds-of-hedge financess have varied over clip. Using robust bootstrap methodological analysiss, they came to the decision that on norm merely 22 % of funds-of-hedge financess deliver positive and important alpha for the period 1995 to 2004. They find strong grounds that hedge financess capital influxs affect negatively the future production of alpha. Fundss with high influxs have lower opportunity to present alpha in the hereafter, proposing a capacity restraint. Teo [ 2009 ] investigates the capacity restraint within the hedge fund industry. He finds that hedge financess are capable to diseconomies of graduated table. Larger hedge financess underperform ex-post smaller financess and the capacity restraints are relentless and important across the industry.

As we can see, there exist among bookmans contradictions on capacity constrain statements in the hedge fund industry. The inquiry remains whether the hedge fund industry witnessed a diminution in public presentation these last decennaries due to its extraordinary enlargement. Naik, Ramadorai and Stromqvist [ 2006 ] use the seven-factor theoretical account of Fung and Hsieh [ 2004 ] to demo that hedge financess alpha has decreased significantly during the period early 2000 to stop of 2004 in comparing to the ninetiess. Interestingly, they find a higher flow agencies for the period with the lowest alphas and conclude that capacity restraints may be the ground for the diminution in alpha. Fung et Al. [ 2008 ] analyzed and divided the development of the alpha of an ain index of financess of financess[ 9 ]into three distinguishable sub-periods. They find a positive alpha merely in the short 2nd period from October 1998 to March 2000 but a important diminution during the period from April 2000 to December 2004.

Zhong [ 2008 ]

The two chief surveies on development of hedge fund public presentation over clip are the essays “ Why does Hedge Fund Alpha lessening over clip? Evidence from Individual Hedge Funds ” of Z. K. Zhong [ 2008 ] and “ Has Hedge Fund Alpha disappeared? ” of M. Ammann, O. Huber, and M. Schmid [ 2009 ] . The first paper references that due do the diminution in the proportion of financess presenting positive alpha, the mean alpha has decreased over clip. Based on their ain scheme indices, Ammann et Al. [ 2009 ] do non happen a important alphas ‘ diminution over clip. In the two following subdivisions, we will show and retroflex both documents in order to insulate the possible grounds behind these differences in decisions. As a first phase, we will concentrate our analysis on the development of equally-weighted scheme indices alphas using the several methodological analysiss. The 2nd portion of this thesis will look into the development of single hedge fund alphas and its distribution over clip. Zhong [ 2008 ] look into the sustainability of individual hedge fund alphas and equally-weighted indices over the period 1994 to 2005. He tries to explicate if and why the public presentation of single financess has decreased. Based on the 7-factors theoretical account of Fung and Hsieh [ 2004 ] , he finds that on norm alphas have declined significantly during the period, particularly during the last sub-period. Furthermore, accommodating the meat denseness calculator of Rosenblatt [ 1956 ] , he analyses the distribution of single hedge fund alphas and happen that the difference of public presentation between the best and the worst financess has become less important over clip and a decreasing figure of fund capable to present positive alphas. In this subdivision, we will therefore use the same information and methodological analysiss and retroflex his survey on equally-weighted indices.

Datas

Zhong used the CISDM informations covering the period from January 1994 to December 2005. Writing this maestro thesis two old ages subsequently, we logically include the disruptive clip during the fiscal crisis and utilize a broader period of clip from January 1994 to January 2009. The database gathers information for over 12950 hedge financess, funds-of-funds and CTAs[ 10 ]. The pick of January 1994 is calculated since the CISDM started describing information on dead financess merely after 1993. We therefore cut down the survivorship prejudice including both lived and defunct financess. To cut down other possible prejudice, we follow Zhong ‘s methodological analysis and enforce some filters to acquire a representative sample: ( 1 ) We include merely financess with both monthly return and AUM informations available ; ( 2 ) We include merely financess that study monthly ; ( 3 ) We include merely financess without apparent abnormality in return or AUM time-series ; ( 4 ) To be included in our analysis, we impose a fund at least 24 monthly back-to-back observations ; ( 5 ) Since managed hereafters and CTA have no clear differentiation in the CISDM database[ 11 ]and are non ever considered as pure hedge fund schemes, we do non take them into consideration. Our sample may endure from backfilling ( or incubation ) prejudice since Zhong does non necessitate non-backfilled returns observations[ 12 ]. To command for it and look into the hardiness of our findings, we delete the first 12 months of each fund and reiterate the analysis in the hardiness subdivision ; ( 6 ) To be included into the equally-weighed indices, we require a fund ‘s AuM to transcend at least one time during its life $ 5 million or its exchange value for not-USD denominated financess[ 13 ]. To command for little financess bias, we repeat our analysis with a sample excepting financess with AuM of less than $ 10 million. After all these readjustment, our concluding sample contains 5768 hedge financess for the analyses of equally-weighted indices and 6069 hedge financess for the analyses of single public presentations divided into 20 different schemes.

We follow Zhong ‘s process and split our sample into 5 evenly-spaced sub-periods in order to look into the development of hedge fund performances over clip. With each 36 monthly returns, this method enables us to separate form and draw decision. Furthermore, to carry on our analysis linked to fudge fund schemes, we follow Zhong ‘s methodological analysis and split the 20 hedge fund strategies into eight classs harmonizing to the categorization standards in Agarwal et Al. [ 2007 ] : Directional Trading, Emerging Markets, Global Macro, Multi-Process, Others, Relative Value, Securities Selection, and Fund of Funds ( see Appendix A ) . We use these eight classs to calculate the schemes ‘ mean alpha but we analyze the 20 schemes individually.

Methodology

To gauge the risk-adjusted public presentation, Zhong [ 2008 ] uses the APT-like seven factors theoretical account of Fung and Hsieh [ 2004 ] . To avoid prejudices present in databases, the theoretical account benchmarks hedge fund returns with hazard asset-based factors build on Fung and Hsieh [ 2002b ] alternatively of hedge fund return-based factors. Regressing the hedge financess ‘ return in surplus of the riskless rate on the seven factors, the theoretical account split the hedge fund return into two classs of hazard: idiosyncratic and systemic. Like an APT theoretical account, the ensuing alphas of the arrested development represent the estimations for the hedge fund scheme public presentation.

Fung and Hsieh [ 2002b ; 2004 ] extracted standard beginnings of hazard in hedge fund returns with chief constituents analysis and associate them to discernible monetary values in market. They explicitly identify the hazard burdens with marketable hazard factors depending on hedge fund schemes. ( 1 ) Trend-following schemes are characterized by attacks wagering on large up or down motions. Their final payments look like long volatility investors final payments, viz. option purchasers. To retroflex it, Fung and Hsieh [ 2004 ] constructed five portfolios of lookback options from exchange-traded options and showed the great similarity in term of returns or correlativity with trend-following financess. ( 2 ) Amalgamation Arbitrage Funds ( or Risk Arbitrage ) stake on amalgamation completion, purchasing the mark stock and shorting the acquirer. Components are based on Mitchell and Pulvino [ 2001 ] that show that returns on hazard arbitrage have high correlativity with the S & A ; P 500 merely in instance of big market diminutions. Put another manner, amalgamation arbitragers face the same hazard than short option Sellerss of out-of-the-money put options on the S & A ; P 500. Beting on amalgamation or acquisition completions, the doomed arises when more minutess failed at the same clip, during bear market notably. ( 3 ) Fung and Hsieh [ 2002a ] found that Fixed-Income hedge financess show exposure to involvement rate spreads, wagering on a tightening recognition spread, shorting high recognition evaluation exchequers and purchasing low evaluation or illiquid fixed income instruments. They include the recognition spread in their theoretical account with the difference between the output on Moody ‘s Baa bonds and the output on the ten-year changeless adulthood exchequer. ( 4 ) Fung and Hsieh [ 2003 ] found that Equity Long/Short financess and Equity Market Neutral financess are exposed to stock market and the difference between little subtractions big cap stocks. They tend to diminish their correlativity to the market hazard, being long little capitalisation stocks and short on big capitalisation stocks. Their theoretical account hence includes the S & A ; P 500 and the difference between the Wilshire 1750 Small Cap index ( SC ) and the Wilshire 750 Large Cap Index ( LC ) . The Fung and Hsieh [ 2004 ] seven-factor theoretical account is hence composed of two Equity factors ( S & A ; P 500, SC-LC spread ) , two Fixed Income factors ( the alteration in 10-year exchequer output and spread between 10-year exchequer and Moody ‘s Baa bonds ) and three Trend-Following factors ( lookback options on bonds, currencies and trade goods )[ 14 ].

In an effort to compare both documents, we complete our analysis by utilizing the same process than Ammann et Al. [ 2009 ] and construct our ain theoretical account in which the hazard factors are chosen by stepwise arrested development. Like Ammann et Al. [ 2009 ] , we begin with the same 23 hazard factors ( see Appendix B ) of the undermentioned plus categories: equities, bonds and recognition, involvement rates, currencies, options, volatility, exchangeable bonds, dynamic trading schemes, existent estate and trade goods. Furthermore, Ammann et Al. include option-based factors like call and put options on the S & A ; P 500 ( Agarwal and Naik [ 2004 ] ) and lookback option straddles suggested by Fung and Hsieh [ 2004 ] to account for non-linear final payments. We use the same iterative process of forward-stepwise choice based on the t-values of the factors coefficients. Following Ammann et Al. [ 2009 ] , we add a factor if its coefficient is important at a 95 % degree and bead all others which are non at the same clip important at a 90 % degree. We so regress returns of an equally-weighted index on the returns of the important factors and reiterate the method until either we get a upper limit of seven factors for each scheme or no other factors are important[ 15 ].

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