The aim of the paper is to analyze the theoretical outlooks sing the consequence of some corporate administration mechanisms on the public presentation of 51 UAE listed houses utilizing the accounting and market informations for 2004.
This survey tries to look into through empirical observation the consequence of some internal and external corporate administration mechanisms on the UAE house public presentation.
A figure of surveies have proposed that houses should run in the involvements of stockholders when markets are perfect. However, in emerging markets, which are imperfect and uncomplete, this is non the instance. Corporate administration systems may supply an appropriate starting point for the development of any policies aimed at constructing an efficient market.
The UAE, like many other developing states all over the universe trying to unify with the planetary economic system, has late initiated the application of international criterions of corporate administration. The major purpose of this paper is to look into the consequence of selected internal and external corporate administration mechanisms on the UAE house public presentation.
A cross-sectional arrested development analysis was employed to prove if there is a important impact of the undermentioned corporate administration mechanisms: the institutional investors ( Instit ) , the governmental ownership ( Gov ) , the board size ( Bos ) , the audit type ( Audtyp ) , the payout ratio ( Divi ) , and the debt ratio ( DA ) upon the public presentation of the UAE houses after commanding the house size ( Size ) .
All sample houses are listed in either the Dubai Financial Market or Abu Dhabi Securities Market ; the pick of houses was based on the handiness of informations.
This survey found that three of the corporate administration mechanisms used in this survey appears to be strong plenty to impact steadfast public presentation in the UAE. However, the other four mechanisms ( including the control variable ) are found to hold a weak consequence on the house public presentation which could be a consequence of the important absence of some facets of corporate administration patterns and deficiency of enforcement of regulations.
These variables are Institutional Investors, Governmental ownership, Payout Dividends Ratio, Debt Equity Ratio, Audit Type, Company ‘s Size and Board ‘s Size.
The survey recommends that the policy shapers in the UAE should develop corporate administration codifications and internal control mechanisms. These codifications should be appropriate for the UAE concern environment while covering the international corporate administration criterions.
Future research should be conducted taking into consideration some of import corporate administration variables such as: degree of ownership concentration, the per centum of the outside board members ( if differences exist ) , the insider ownership, the vote alliances and product-market competition. Additional research might besides be directed at the consequence of corporate administration mechanisms on the public presentation of UAE houses utilizing larger samples and a longer clip series.
The International Journal of Accounting 41 ( 2006 ) 176-197
Ownership, board construction, and public presentation in Continental Europe
San Diego State University, USA
This survey aims to analyze the empirical cogency of claims that the composing of boards of managers and ownership constructions affect houses ‘ profitableness ratios ( ROE, ROA, and MTB ) .
During the 1990s, the procedure of economic integrating was heightened by the creative activity of different brotherhoods ( European Union, NAFTA, etc. ) , the prostration of the Soviet system, and the rush in planetary economic activities. These include amalgamations among big corporations, the flow of capital, goods, and services across national boundary lines, the competitory force per unit areas of globalisation, denationalization, and the growing and diffusion of shareholding. All these activities have created a demand to understand national corporate-governance patterns and their association with the fiscal places of the houses.
In this survey, the writer used informations from 81 European companies ( foreign U.S. registrants ) stand foring a 2-year period ( 2000-2001 ) .
ROA, ROE-accounting returns on entire mean assets and the book value of the stockholders ‘ invested capital for 2000 and 2001.
Firm AGE, TDEB/TCAP, measures the capital construction of each company, TASSET, the size variable is computed as the logarithm of entire assets and GROWTH is computed as the difference in mean per centum alteration in entire assets for 2 subsequent old ages prior to the twelvemonth of involvement.
% INDIR- ( entire figure of insiders in the board ) / Total_DIR
Entire figure of managers in both grades, when it applies, % INDEP
Entire figure of independent managers / # Total_DIR
% GOV- ( figure of elect representatives on board ) / ( entire # of managers ) )
Outside stockholder concentration
% INSTN- ( figure of portions held by establishments ) / ( entire figure of common portions outstanding in 2000 and
2001 financial twelvemonth ends )
% BLOCK-a entire per centum of the houses ‘ outstanding portions of block holders who hold at least 5 % of the outstanding portions and are non affiliated with direction ( excepting establishments )
Inside ownership/power concentration
CEO/OW-dummy variable to enter the fact that the company is family-owned and CEO is the laminitis of the house
MNGOW-the cumulative per centum of ownership in the house held by insiders directors ) , who serve on the board ( mean figure of portions owned by all managers / mean figure of common portions outstanding at
2001 financial twelvemonth terminal )
CEO/CH-dummy variable to enter the fact the CEO of the company is appointed as the chair of the board of managers
Initially, this sample included 87 companies from nine European states, which were members of the European Union in 1999. The sample contained all companies from nine CEUM that are traded consecutively on the NYSE during 2000 and 2001. The information from six companies were non systematically available and the concluding sample includes merely 81 companies. All companies included in the sample prepare their fiscal statements harmonizing to IAS and register 20-F with the SEC.
The consequences indicate a strong positive relation between the degree of relational-investors ownership ( % INST ) and profitableness ratios, every bit good as a strong, positive relation between the part of independent managers on the board and profitableness ratios, but no strong relation between the part of inside managers or degree of managerial ownership and profitableness in European companies.
Future research ( there are non recommendations )
CRRC 2008: Call for Papers unfastened!
7-9 September 2008
Queen ‘s University Belfast
hypertext transfer protocol: //www.crrconference.org
Corporate GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF
SELECTED COMMERCIAL BANKS IN UGANDA
This paper aims at set uping the relationship between the nucleus rules of corporate administration and fiscal public presentation in commercial Bankss of Uganda.
The overall purpose of this paper is to look into the nexus between, fiscal public presentation and the Core pillars of corporate administration ; transparence, revelation and trust in commercial Bankss in Uganda, within International and local Commercial Banks with central offices in Kampala District, Stanbic Bank, Cairo Bank, Orient Bank and CERUDE Bank were the cardinal focal point in this paper. In order to accomplish this purpose bank one-year studies formed a major beginning of fiscal informations used to estimate fiscal public presentation. Fiscal public presentation was measured utilizing CAEL Model which was later correlated with corporate administration variable.
A scope of informations aggregation tools and informations analysis techniques were used. This survey was conducted as a cross sectional and correlational probe. Given that the cardinal focal point was to look into the relationship between Corporate administration and fiscal public presentation. The mark population included depositors ( account holders ) in Bank R
( 6,228 Elementss ) , Bank Y ( 527,681 Elementss ) , Bank Z ( 14,357 Elementss ) and Bank M ( 344,005 Elementss ) . Other stakeholders considered include 16 BOU functionaries in charge of fiscal Institutions, and 16 URA functionaries.
Four commercial Bankss that deal with both retail and corporate clients were selected.
Choice was based on figure of history holders as provided by B.O.U. Two Commercial Banks with highest figure of history holders – one international and one local and two commercial Banks with lowest figure of history holders – one international and one local. These four Bankss represented a balanced place for the commercial Banks based in Uganda. So the sample in this survey was 388.
Findingss indicate that Corporate Governance predicts 34.5 % of the discrepancy in the general fiscal public presentation of Commercial Bankss in Uganda. However the important subscribers to fiscal public presentation include openness and dependability. Openness and Reliability are steps of trust. On the other manus recognition hazard as a step of revelation has a negative relationship with fiscal public presentation.
It is obvious that trust has a important impact on fiscal public presentation ; given that transparence and revelation boosts the trustiness of commercial Bankss. Banks both local and international should implement full revelation patterns and transparence patterns thereby heightening trust in order to last in the competitory fiscal landscape.